BANGLADESH NEWS
The draft bill of Bangla- desh Atomic Energy Control Act 2012 has been approved by the cabinet last week, paving the way for the formation of a separate regulator to look after nuclear safety issues that will eventually come when the Rooppur nuclear power plant is commissioned. The bill has several interesting provisions. Section 43 states that the Russian operator Rosatom will take total responsibility for any damages caused due to accident at the plant, subject to proof of negligence by operator. Secondly, the operator will also bear responsibility for theft, loss or abandonment of nuclear material. The company will provide fuel for the lifespan of the power plant and spent fuel will be taken away for safe storage.
From what has been stated above, there is room for further scrutiny on a number of issues. According to Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority, the country will need 400 engineers to build the plant. Timeline for plant commissioning ranges between 8 12 years from now. This will prove to be a major challenge for the engineering universities and whether or not the country will be able to pool together necessary human resources to pull off this feat is a subject matter of another discussion.
Though the proposed Act states that the operator is going to be held responsible for physical safety of nuclear material, the risks associated with theft affect not only national but regional security. Of more concern is to what extent safeguards are going to be taken from a future accident leading to a meltdown. Needless to say, any such accident along the lines of Fukushima Daichi plant in Japan will have disastrous effects in a densely populated country like Bangladesh that has, of late, been experiencing increased seismic activity. Unlike Japan with its four decades of experience in generating nuclear power, Bangladesh lacks the experience, the emergency response institutions and the financial resourcefulness to tackle any such incident. Ruling aside the financial aspect, building up capabilities in other areas will require a timeline that extend into decades of operating nuclear technology.
Though the agreement allows for Rosatom to take spent nuclear fuel (SNF) back to Russia, the complexities involved in transportation of SNF in terms of specialised casks and equipment are another area of concern. According to a case study published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) titled "Return of Research Reactor Spent Fuel to the Country of Origin: Requirements for Technical and Administrative Preparations and National Experiences," German companies specialising in transport casks for SNF were contracted to transport back Brazilian SNF to the United States. These casks are built to very high safety standards: "The transport cask GNS 11 and GNS 16 are designed in a sandwich construction. The cylindrical cask basically consists of the following components: inner liner with inner liner bottom, lead filling, and wall with bottom plate, side wall cover sheet with spacer wire, head ring, primary lid and protective plate. The components of the cask body and the primary lid are manufactured in stainless steel. In the terms of the transport regulations, the 'leak-tight containment' consists of the inner liner, the inner bottom plate, head ring, primary lid, with the bolt joint, and the internal seal of the two concentrical Viton seals. Cap screws are used in order to fasten the primary lid. The closure lid is also fastened to the primary lid using cap screws. In order to achieve the shielding effect, the space between the inner liner and the shell is filled with lead casting. A pair of trunnions is bolted on to the head ring in order to attach handling devices. During transport, the cask is provided with a protective plate. In order to reduce the shock loads arising during the eventual drop of the cask, as stipulated for type B packaging, impact limiters made of wood with a steel-plate shell are attached to the ends of the cask body on the lid and bases sides."
That is not all, transportation of these "casks" required a massive security operation involving several law enforcement agencies and the highway and main avenues and streets in Sao Paulo were closed during the operation. Personnel involved in shipment of containers were constantly monitored by radiation protection teams and IAEA members. The boat, once it left port, was escorted by a naval vessel until it reached international waters.
Given the elaborate security and safety measures involved in the case presented above, one could easily be led to question whether such measures can be undertaken to transport SNF from the Rooppur site all the way to Chittagong port for shipment back to country of source, i.e. Russia. These are matters that cannot be relegated to later years; rather, they must be fully addressed in the draft bill before it is enacted into law. Should more time be required to bring in international technical experts to scrutinise the nitty-gritty details of the Act so that Bangladesh is not left high-and-dry at the end of the day, then such time should be taken.
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